

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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E.O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON FEBRUARY 26 MEETING (SALT TWO - 532)

1. AT TODAY'S MEETING BOTH OF US CAME DIRECTLY TO GRIPS WITH MIRV VERIFICATION ISSUE. IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT SEMENOV TOOK UP OUR FOUR QUESTIONS AND REJECTED OUR ANSWERS ONE BY ONE AS BEING CONTRARY TO THE FREEDOM-TO-MIX AND MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT PROVISIONS OF THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING. MY STATEMENT, WHICH FOLLOWED HIS, LAID STRESS ON IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING AMBIGUITIES, UNCERTAINTIES AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS OVER QUESTIONS OF COMPLIANCE ESPECIALLY WITH THE AGREEMENT'S SPECIAL MIRV PROVISIONS AS THIS COULD ONLY RESULT IN IMPAIRING RATHER THAN IMPROVING RELATIONS. DURING COURSE OF MY STATEMENT I SPELLED OUT IN GREATER DETAIL PROBLEM ARISING FROM INABILITY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SS-18S DEPLOYED WITH SINGLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES AND THOSE DEPLOYED WITH MIRVS.

2. IN OUR PRIVATE TALK I FOLLOWED UP WITH SAME THEME, DENYING WE WERE SEEKING TO ESTABLISH ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS, BUT AGAIN USING THE SS-18 ILLUSTRATION SAID WE COULD NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SINGLE AND MIRVED VERSIONS; IF THEY COULD TELL US HOW WE COULD, OR COULD GIVE A DIFFERENT ANSWER TO QUESTION WE HAD RAISED,

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WE WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED WHAT THEY HAD TO SAY. DURING COURSE

OF CONVERSATION HE SAID THAT THEY ALSO HAD CONCERNS ON THEIR SIDE OVER FUTURE DEVELOPMENT IN US OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. HOWEVER HE REFUSED TO FOLLOW UP MY INVITATION TO EXPAND ON THIS THEME AND EXPRESS THEIR CONCERNS WHICH I SAID I WAS FULLY WILLING TO CONSIDER AND DISCUSS. AT END OF OUR PRIVATE CONVERSATION, READING FROM NOTES, HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE INCONCEIVABLE THAT EITHER SIDE WOULD FEEL THAT THEY COULD GET BY WITH A VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT WITHOUT DETECTION BY THE OTHER SIDE, OR THAT EITHER SIDE WOULD WANT TO FACE THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATION WHICH WOULD ONLY SET UP A FUTILE ACTION - REACTION CYCLE THE HOPELESSNESS AND FUTILITY OF WHICH BOTH SIDES HAVE RECOGNIZED. I CLOSED OFF THE CONVERSATION BY STATING THAT I ENTIRELY AGREED ON CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH VIOLATIONS AND POINTED OUT THAT FROM THE BEGINNING OF THESE TALKS THE PRINCIPLE HAD BEEN THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD BE ABLE TO SATISFY ITSELF ON COMPLIANCE BY OTHER SIDE AND I WAS SEEKING TO AVOID SITUATION IN WHICH, THROUGH LACK OF INFORMATION AND THROUGH MISUNDERSTANDING, ONE SIDE COULD COME TO CONCLUSION THAT OTHER SIDE WAS VIOLATING AGREEMENT. HE SAID THAT AT NEXT MEETING HE PLANNED TO DISCUSS ARTICLE XIII OF SOVIET DRAFT ON FBS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES. I VISUALLY INDICATED SOME LACK OF ENTHUSIASM BUT MADE NO COMMENT.

3. IN A BILATERAL CONVERSATION WITH ROWNY, SHCHUKIN REPEATED SAME THEMES, STATING THAT ANSWERS WE GAVE TO OUR QUESTIONS WOULD "LEAD SOVIETS INTO PATHS THEY COULD NOT FOLLOW" AND HE WAS SATISFIED THAT BY ALL NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING THOSE "OTHER THAN PHOTOGRAPHY" WE WOULD, IN TIME, BE ABLE TO SATISFY OURSELVES "FROM ALL THE INDICATORS" THAT THEY WERE COMPLYING WITH THE AGREEMENT. HE SAID THAT APPLICATIONS OF OUR ANSWERS TO SITUATION COULD PERHAPS LEAD TO CONCLUSION THAT THEY WERE DEPLOYING 2000 MIRVS, WHEN IN FACT THEY INTENDED TO ADHERE STRICTLY TO THE 1320 LIMITATION. HE REITERATED STATEMENT THAT HE HAD MADE TO MAY THAT THEY WERE SATISFIED WITH THEIR ABILITY TO VERIFY OUR DEPLOYMENTS AND THAT TO THE DEGREE ANY PROBLEM EXISTED IT WAS ON OUR SIDE. IT WAS UP TO US TO SATISFY OUR OWN PEOPLE. HE INVITED ROWNY TO REPEAT OUR RATIONALE ON INCLUSION OF BACKFIRE AND ALSO INVITED ROWNY TO GIVE RATIONALE FOR NOT INCLUDING CRUISE MISSILES ALONG WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES IN ASMS.

4. DURING COURSE OF THEIR CONVERSATION WITH EARLE, WHICH WAS LARGELY
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DEVOTED TO SS-18 PROBLEM, TRUSOV AND BELETSKY SAID THAT WE SHOULD ASSUME THAT THEY WILL DEPLOY BOTH THE MIRVED AND UNMIRVED VERSIONS OF THE SS-18.

5. NEXT MEETING WILL BE ON FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 28.
JOHNSON

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NNN

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